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Abstract
Kak’s three-stage protocol for quantum key distribution is revisited with special focus on its hitherto unknown strengths
and weaknesses. It is shown that this protocol can be used for secure direct quantum communication. Further, the imple-
mentability of this protocol in the realistic situation is analyzed by considering various Markovian noise models. It is found
that the Kak’s protocol and its variants in their original form can be implemented only in a restricted class of noisy chan-
nels, where the protocols can be transformed to corresponding protocols based on logical qubits in decoherence free subspace.
Specifically, it is observed that Kak’s protocol can be implemented in the presence of collective rotation and collective dephas-
ing noise, but cannot be implemented in its original form in the presence of other types of noise, like amplitude damping and
phase damping noise. Further, the performance of the protocol in the noisy environment is quantified by computing average
fidelity under various noise models, and subsequently a set of preferred states for secure communication in noisy environment
have also been identified.
1 Introduction
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed the first protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD) [1]. It succeeded to draw
the attention of the cryptography community immediately as it could provide unconditional security, which is a desired but
unachievable feat in the classical world. Because of these interesting features of QKD, the pioneering work of Bennett and
Brassard was followed by a large number of protocols for QKD [2–5] and secure direct quantum communication [6–8] (where
prior generation of a key is not required) (see [9] for a review). Among these schemes, only a few schemes have been realized
experimentally ( [10–15] and references therein). Further, almost all the experimentally realized schemes of secure quantum
communication are protocols for QKD. Only, recently a few schemes of secure direct quantum communication have been
realized experimentally [14–16]. This fact motivated us to look for simple schemes of secure direct quantum communication
that can be realized experimentally. During our investigation, we realized that there exists an experimentally implemented
scheme for secure quantum communication, which can be viewed as a scheme for secure direct quantum communication,
but in the original proposal as well as in the follow-up works, it has been described as a scheme for QKD. Specifically, a
three-stage protocol for QKD was proposed by Kak in 2006 [17] and experimentally implemented in 2013 by Mandal et
al. [18]. This scheme has certain advantages over the conventional BB84 protocol and its variants. For example, it does
not require single photon source and can be implemented using multi-photon pulses [18, 19]. Further, it can be modified to
obtain three-stage quantum protocols for other quantum communication tasks. For example, three-stage schemes for quantum
oblivious transform [20] has been proposed1 using Kak’s protocol. A quantum signature scheme [22] and a public key
cryptography scheme [23] based on Kak’s three-stage protocol were also proposed. This protocol is also found useful in
quantumhandshake [24], intensity-aware [25] and threshold quantum cryptography [26], and in a variant of it where each pulse
transmits more than one bit [27]. Attempts have also been made to reduce the number of rounds of quantum communication
in the three-stage protocol by proposing single-stage and braided single-stage protocols [28], where Bob is already aware of
the unitary operation Alice has applied. However, this 1 stage variant of Kak’s protocol fails to qualify as a scheme for QKD
as it requires a prior knowlge of the unitary operation which equivalent to a pre-shared key.
All the above mentioned three-stage schemes are interesting in their own merit. However, the effects of noise on those
schemes are not rigorously studied. Of course, in Refs. [29, 30] and Ref. [31], it is claimed that effect of collective rotation
(CR) noise and uniform distribution of error caused due to different sources of noise on Kak’s protocol have been studied,
respectively, but these efforts were not mathematically rigorous. Keeping this fact in mind, in the present paper, the effects of
different types of noise models (e.g., amplitude damping (AD), phase damping (PD), collective dephasing (CD), CR) on the
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1Note that [20] contradicts the well established results of Ref. [21] and the protocol reported [20] is not loophole free.
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Kak-type three-stage protocols of secure quantum communication have been studied. Here, we have considered that the noise
parameters remain same for each round of travel through the quantum channel for all three-stages of the particular quantum
communication process. In what follows, the effect of noise is illustrated by plotting the fidelity of the expected quantum state
and the produced quantum state vs decoherence and other relevant parameters. In most of the cases, we have observed that the
effect of PD noise is more than that of the AD noise for the same decoherence rate. Very interestingly, it has been observed
that Kak’s protocol only works under CR noise. It fails under AD, PD, and CD noise. This is so because the Kraus operators
of the noise models (except that of CR) do not commute with unitary operators used by Alice and Bob in Kak’s three-stage
protocol. A similar conclusion holds for other protocols of secure quantum communications that are based on Kak’s protocol.
Finally, we have tried to propose some methods that may be adapted to circumvent this problem and implement Kak-type
three-stage protocols in the presence of noise.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we briefly discuss the Kak’s three-stage protocol and its origin of
security and uniqueness in Section 3. Thereafter, the effect of noise on three-stage protocol is studied in the next two sections
before concluding in Section 6.
2 Kak’s three-stage protocol
To beginwith, we briefly describeKak’s original three-stage protocol for QKD [17] which may be summarized in the following
steps:
1. Alice prepares a single qubit quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ {(α|0〉+ β|1〉) , (β|0〉 − α|1〉)}. The basis and the correspond-
ing bit values for both orthogonal states has been priorly decided, i.e., for sending a 0 (1) she prepares α|0〉 + β|1〉
(β|0〉 − α|1〉).
2. Alice applies a unitary operator UA ≡ R (θ) to transform the state |ψ〉 to |ψ′〉 = R(θ)|ψ〉 and sends the transformed
qubit |ψ′〉 to Bob. Here, the unitary operator used is a rotation operatorR(θ) =
[
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
]
.
3. Bob independently applies a unitary transformationUB ≡ R (φ) to transform |ψ′〉 into |ψ′′〉 = R(φ)|ψ′〉 = R(φ)R(θ)|ψ〉 =
R(θ)R(φ)|ψ〉 (in the last step we have used the fact that two arbitrary rotation operators commute) and sends it back to
Alice.
4. This time Alice applies U
†
A = U
−1
A to transform |ψ′′〉 to |ψ′′′〉 = R(φ)|ψ〉 and sends the qubit again to Bob.
5. Bob applies U
†
B = U
−1
B to obtain |ψ〉 the state (bit value) Alice wanted to share.
Although Kak introduced the above protocol as a protocol for QKD, it is easy to recognize that Alice is not bound to send
a random bit value using this scheme. She can always send a sequence of meaningful bits using this scheme and thus Kak’s
protocol should be viewed as a protocol of quantum secure direct communication, where a message can be transmitted directly
without constructing a prior key. Once we recognize this protocol as a scheme of quantum secure direct communication
we can naturally extend it to construct several other schemes of secure quantum communication that are variants of direct
communication (for a detail discussion see [32] and references therein). There exist several schemes for secure direct quantum
communication [6,8,14,33,34]. In fact, it is easy to show that famous BB84 scheme can be transformed to a scheme for secure
direct quantum communication if one allows Bob to use quantum memory. To be precise, if Bob stores the string of single
photons corresponding to message and checking qubits prepared randomly in {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} in a quantum memory
until Alice discloses the positions and basis of the checking qubits. Using the same basis Bob performs a measurement of
these verification qubits and announces the measurement outcomes, which help Alice in deciding whether to proceed with
announcing the basis used to prepare the message qubits when error rate is below the threshold limit. Thus, Alice and Bob
can perform a direct communication with no need of key generation. It may be noted that most of the well known protocols
for direct secure quantum communication schemes use quantum memory. For example, we may briefly describe ping-pong
protocol [6] for direct secure quantum communication as a scheme where Bob prepares a Bell state and sends a qubit to Alice
to encode her message keeping another qubit in a quantum memory before measuring both the qubits in Bell basis to extract
the secret 2. Similarly, LM05 protocol [8], Shukla et al.’s protocol [33], recent experimental implementation by Zhang et
al. [15] for direct secure quantum communication do use quantum memory. This is the point where the actual strength of
Kak’s protocol lies. It does not require quantum memory. This is important as quantum memory is a very costly resource
2An alternative definition exists in the literature [34] according to which Kak’s scheme should be viewed as a scheme for deterministic QKD since it
does not involve block transmission. However, a deterministic QKD scheme can be adapted to perform direct secure quantum communication if the sender
encrypts the message with a randomly chosen private key before sending it to the receiver using deterministic QKD and revealing the key only when she
ensures the secure transmission of ciphertext.
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and so far we do not have any good solution for a reliable quantum register that can store qubits for a reasonable amount of
time. To the best of our knowledge, there exists only one proposal for direct secure quantum communication without quantum
memory [35]. In the Yang’s scheme [35], LM05 protocol [8] of direct secure quantum communication was suitably modified
to obtain a scheme for QSDC without quantum memory.
Further, several direct communication schemes have been modified to obtain solutions of various cryptographic tasks,
such as controlled [36, 37], asymmetric [38] and multiparty [39] variants of direct communication schemes, quantum e-
commerce [40], quantum voting [41], quantum sealed-bid auction [42], quantum private comparison [40, 43]. Therefore, the
use of quantum memory plays an instrumental role in the implementation of some of these schemes as well and modified
Kak’s protocol can help us to circumvent the use of quantum memory in the experimental realization of the above mentioned
cryptographic tasks.
3 Nature and origin of security
Schemes for secure quantum communication can be broadly divided into two types, orthogonal-state-based schemes and
conjugate-coding-based scheme. Orthogonal state based schemes, such as Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol [5], use the same
basis for encoding, decoding and eavesdropping checking. Whereas in the conjugate-coding-based schemes, like BB84 pro-
tocol [1], the security comes from non-commutativity and no-cloning theorems. The origin of unconditional security in the
quantum domain can also be understood from the splitting of information. Precisely, the sender splits useful information in
multiple quantum and classical pieces and ensures all of them remain unavailable to unintended intruders until the secure com-
munication is accomplished. In case of Kak’s protocol, the sender prepares a quantum piece (qubit) and withholds a classical
information (unitary UA) until the receiver also composes a classical piece (another unitary UB) to perform the cryptographic
task. As UA and UB are not directly used for the encoding, decoding or eavesdropping checking, and as these operations can
be done using orthogonal states, this protocol can be implemented as an orthogonal-state-based protocol.
4 Effect of noise
The beauty of the Kak’s protocol lies in the fact that UA and UB commute, and the original security proof is restricted
to the ideal situation, where there is no noise present in the channel between Alice and Bob. However, in any practical
implementation of the scheme, it would be impossible to completely circumvent noise. Keeping this in mind, in what follows,
we wish to investigate the effect of various types of noise on Kak’s protocol and its variants. The effect of noise on Kak’s
protocol can be studied using Kraus operators for various noise models.
Mathematically, evolution of a single qubit quantum state ρ in the noisy environment can be described using the Kraus
operator formalism as [44–47]
ρk =
∑
i
Eki ρ
(
Eki
)†
, (1)
where Eki s are the Kraus operator for a specific noise model (displayed as superscript k) under consideration. Before we
proceed further, we need to state the Kraus operators for various noise models. In the following subsection, we have listed the
Kraus operators for various noise models that are investigated in this work.
4.1 Kraus operators for various noise models
1. AD noise: The spontaneous emission from a high energy state is modeled by the following set of Kraus operators
[45–47]:
EA
0
=
[
1 0
0
√
1− ηA
]
, EA
1
=
[
0
√
ηA
0 0
]
, (2)
where the decoherence rate ηA such that 0 ≤ ηA ≤ 1 depends on the interaction between the system and the environ-
ment.
2. PD noise: This dephasing noise model is described by the Kraus operators [45, 46]:
EP
0
=
[
1 0
0
√
1− ηP
]
, EP
1
=
[
0 0
0
√
ηP
]
, (3)
with the decoherence rate ηP (0 ≤ ηP ≤ 1) involves interaction without energy loss.
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3. CD noise model: A coherent effect of environment on all the qubits traveling through a channel is studied as collective
noise models [48, 49]. This kind of noise model is described by unitary operations, unlike Kraus operators of AD
or PD channels. Specifically, collective noise is studied as CD and CR noise models. The effect of CD noise is
characterized ( [50] and references therein) by ED |0〉 = |0〉 and ED |1〉 = exp (iΦ) |1〉 . One can easily obtain that
ED =
[
1 0
0 exp (iΦ)
]
is a phase gate only. Here, Φ is the noise parameter that remains the same for all the travel
qubits at any instant of time. However, it can take different values while independent use of a channel at different times.
4. CR noise model: Similar to the CD noise model, this type of noise ( [50] and references therein) is defined to affect as
ER |0〉 = cosΘ |0〉+sinΘ |1〉 andER |1〉 = − sinΘ |0〉+cosΘ |1〉 , which can be easily defined due to the application
of a unitary rotation ER =
[
cosΘ − sinΘ
sinΘ cosΘ
]
. Quite similar to the CD noise, hereΘ is the noise parameter that may
change with time and affects all the travel qubits in the same way.
4.2 Commutativity of the rotation operator used in Kak’s protocol and the Kraus operators
Using the open quantum system approach mentioned in Eq. (1), we can summarize the evolution of a single qubit quantum
state under the Kak’s three-stage protocol in the noisy environment as
ρk =
∑
i,j,l
(
(R (φ))
†
Eki R ((θ))
†
EkjR (φ)E
k
l R (θ)
)
ρ
(
(R (φ))
†
Eki R ((θ))
†
EkjR (φ)E
k
l R (θ)
)†
. (4)
Here, k ∈ {AD,PD} corresponds to the type of noise model under consideration, and ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| is the single qubit initial
state prepared by Alice. The single qubit state is rotated by an angle θ (φ) in the Bloch sphere by Alice’s (Bob’s) operation
in Step 1 (3). Additionally, different i, j, and l in the subscript represent independent effects of noise during Alice–to–Bob,
Bob–to–Alice, and Alice–to–Bob travels of single qubit, respectively.
At a first glance, one can easily conclude that the beauty of the Kak’s protocol (i.e., commutativity of rotation operators by
Alice and Bob) could only be preserved if the rotation operators commute with the Kraus operators for various noise models.
To begin with, let us consider a simple situation in which Kak’s protocol is implemented using an AD channel, and in the
first two stages of the protocol (i.e., from Alice–to–Bob and Bob–to–Alice journey), noise affects the qubit via EA
0
, in this
situation, instead of |ψ′′〉 = R(φ)R(θ)|ψ〉 = R(θ)R(φ)|ψ〉, Alice would receive |ψ′′〉 = EA
0
R(φ)EA
0
R(θ)|ψ〉. Note that
Alice would be able to remove her encryption UA = R(θ) by applying U
†
A = U
−1
A if and only if R(θ) commutes with E
A
0
(i.e., iff
[
EA
0
, R(θ)
]
= 0). However, we can easily compute that
[
EA
0
, R(θ)
]
= EA
0
R(θ)−R(θ)EA
0
=
(
1−
√
1− η
)
sin θ
[
0 1
1 0
]
. (5)
For this commutator to vanish, i.e.,
[
EA
0
, R(θ)
]
= 0, we require either η = 0 or θ = 0. The former case corresponds to
noiseless situation while the latter case corresponds to no rotation applied by Alice in the Bloch sphere in Kak’s protocol, i.e.,
R(θ) becomes identity and eavesdropper’s ignorance becomes zero. These are trivial cases, and the analysis shows that in the
above situation Kak’s protocol does not work in its original form. The observation can be further strengthened by noting that
[
EA
1
, R(θ)
]
= EA
1
R(θ)−R(θ)EA
1
= −√η sin θ
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, (6)
where the results obtained from Eq. (5) remains valid. Hence, it can be summarized that Kak’s three-stage protocol fails under
AD noise as the rotation operator of Alice operated in the second step of Kak’s protocol will not be nullified by the inverse
operator of the same rotation operator applied in the fourth step of the protocol.
Similar studies can be performed for other kind of noises, like PD noise. In fact, it is observed that bothEP
0
and EP
1
result
in the same conclusion as we obtained for the AD noise channel. Similar investigations over the CD and CR noise is quite easy
to perform as the effect of noise is characterized using unitary operators in both these cases. Specifically, the CD noise leads
to the same result that the rotation operator commutes only in the ideal condition, and in the noisy scenario, for Φ = 2npi with
an integer n (as the unitary for CD noise reduces to an identity)3. It would also be worth noting here that CR noise does not
affect the protocol as two arbitrary rotation operators always commute with each other. Hence, Kak’s protocol would work
under CR noise. One such attempt to analyze the Kak’s three-stage protocol over CR noise in multi-photon case [29], and it
is shown to possess higher error rate tolerance than the single photon case.
3Here, it may be noted that although Kak’s protocol in its original form would not work under the CD noise, there are techniques to use logical qubits
and thus to exploit the advantage of a decoherence free subspace to realize Kak’s protocol in presence of CD noise [50, 51], but no such decoherence free
subspace is known for the AD and PD noise.
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It is expected that a similar study on the squeezed generalized amplitude damping channel would also lead to the same
conclusion as generalized amplitude damping and AD noise channels are only the limiting cases of squeezed generalized
amplitude damping channel.
5 Formal investigation on the effect of noise on the Kak’s three-stage protocol
The effect of noise can be formally investigated by comparing the quantum state ρk produced in the noisy environment with
the state ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| which was expected at the Bob’s port after three-stages of quantum communication in the absence of
noise. The comparison can be performed using fidelity
F = 〈ψ|ρk|ψ〉, (7)
which is the square of the conventional definition of fidelity. In addition, for the convenience of discussion, an arbitrary single
qubit quantum state which is to be transmitted by Alice in Step 1 (before application of UA) to send a bit value "0" can be
assumed as |ψ1〉 = cos ξ|0〉+ sin ξ|1〉; whereas Alice has to send an orthogonal state |ψ2〉 = sin ξ|0〉 − cos ξ|1〉 to send a bit
value of "1". Therefore, the initial density matrix will be ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| with |ψ〉 ∈ {|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉}.
In the presence of AD noise (i.e., when the qubit is subjected to AD noise), using Eqs. (2) and (7) a closed form analytic
expression of fidelity is computed as
FAD =
1
16
[−η (η2 − 3 (√1− η + 2) η + 7√1− η + 9)+ 4 (√1− η + 3)
− (η − 1) (η (η + 3√1− η − 5)− 4√1− η + 4) cos(4ξ)] , (8)
which is averaged over two possible choices of the initial state by Alice, depending up on the bit value of the message she
wishes to send.
Along the same line, a similar study over purely dephasing kind of noise (i.e., PD noise) using Eqs. (3) and (7) led to the
following compact expression
FPD =
1
8
((
−
√
1− ηη + 3η + 4
√
1− η − 4
)
sin2(2ξ)− 3η + 8
)
. (9)
The fidelity of the quantum state received by Bob over collective noisy channels with that of Alice’s initially prepared
state is computed as
FCD =
1
32
(
6 cos2(2θ) cos(2Φ) + sin2(2θ)(15 cos(Φ) + cos(3Φ)) + 5 cos(4θ) + 21
)
(10)
and
FCR = cos
2(3Θ), (11)
for CD and CR channels, respectively.
Note that the choice of state parameter ξ by Alice is a public knowledge (i.e., decided at the beginning of the protocol
by Alice and Bob), which is a continuous variable in the domain {0, 2pi} . Therefore, before reaching to any conclusion from
Eqs. (8) and (9), it would also be imperative to compute the average fidelity by taking into account all possible choices of ξ
using
F avk =
1
2pi
∫
2pi
0
Fkdθ. (12)
The average fidelity expressions calculated over AD and PD noise channels are
F avAD =
1
16
(
4
(√
1− η + 3
)
− η
(
η2 − 3
(√
1− η + 2
)
η + 7
√
1− η + 9
))
, (13)
and
F avPD =
1
16
(√
1− η + 3
)
(4− η), (14)
respectively.
Similarly, average fidelity in the case of qubit subjected to CR noise is
F avCD =
1
64
(15 cos(φ) + 6 cos(2φ) + cos(3φ) + 42). (15)
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Figure 1: (Color online) Variation of average fidelity as a function of noise parameters of AD and PD noise is shown in (a). In
(b), fidelity for the choice of initial states in the computational {|0〉, |1〉} and diagonal {|+〉, |−〉} basis is also shown. In (c),
dependence on the choice of initial state is illustrated through a three-dimensional plot where light yellow (dark blue) colored
surfaces correspond to fidelity calculated over AD and PD noise models, respectively.
Figure 2: (Color online) Variation of average fidelity as a function of noise parameters, when the qubit is subjected to collective
noises. In (a), fidelity for specific choice of initial states in the computational {|0〉, |1〉} and diagonal {|+〉, |−〉} basis is shown
along with the average fidelity. Here, the noise parameter χ = Θ (Φ) for CR (CD) noise. In (b) and (c), dependence on the
choice of initial state evolving under CD noise is illustrated through a contour and a three-dimensional plots.
Also, from Eq. (11) one can conclude that F avCR = FCR as the obtained expression for FCR is independent of the choice of
the initial state.
Finally, we have established dependence of fidelity (in Eqs. (8) and (9)) on the state parameter, and also shown its
variation along with average fidelity (in Eqs. (13) and (14)) in Figure 1. The obtained fidelity and average fidelity over a PD
noise channel is always better than that for AD channel (cf. Figure 1 (a) and (c)). Further, in Figure 1 (b), we compare the
obtained average fidelity with that of the fidelity for the initial states chosen from the computational {|0〉, |1〉} and diagonal
{|+〉, |−〉} basis. It establishes that the computational basis is preferable for the channels with high decoherence rate, while
the diagonal basis is the worst choice. The same fact can also be verified from Figure 1 (c). Moreover, the choice of initial
state becomes irrelevant in case of AD channels and low decoherence rate PD channels.
A similar study on CR noise shows that fidelity for CR noise is independent of state parameters and is a periodic function
of the noise parameter Θ with period pi
3
(cf. dotted (cyan) line in Fig. 2 (a)). Therefore, there are some specific values of the
noise parameter for which the state reaches unaffected. This feature can be attributed to the fact that two arbitrary rotation
operators commute with each other.
On the contrary, the choice of the initial state plays a very important role in the fidelity that can be obtained over the CD
noise as shown in Fig. 2. Specifically, the fidelity over CD channels for the noise parameter Φ = pi increases (decreases) to
unity (zero) for the choice of computational (diagonal) basis as shown in Fig. 2 (a). Also the average value of the fidelity, as
expected, tends to its lowest value 0.5. The dependence of fidelity on the state parameters is also established using a contour
and a three-dimensional plots in Fig. 2 (b) and (c).
One can conclude from the study of analyzing the performance of Kak’s protocol in various types of noise models that
the commutation, which plays the most important role in the three-stage protocol, between the rotation and noise operators
(discussed in the previous subsection) epitomizes the whole scenario.
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6 Conclusion
We have shown that the three-stage QKD protocol proposed by Kak can work as a scheme for secure direct quantum com-
munication. This provides opportunity to exploit the benefits of single qubit based Kak’s protocol in the field of direct
communication and their variants as solutions of socioeconomic problems of relevance. However, such a dedicated effort
would require serious effort to analyze the feasibility of Kak’s protocol under various noise models. The present study has
established that Kak’s protocol would face serious problems in presence of noise. It’s further established that there are certain
single qubit states which are preferred over other states for the implementation of Kak’s protocol in presence of noise. This
is in sharp contrast with the observations made on the basis of the original scheme. Specifically, in the original protocol,
presence of noise was not considered and there was no preference about the states to be chosen to represent bit values 0 and 1.
Interestingly, in the presence of noise such a choice is found to influence the fidelity and thus the performance of the scheme.
It has also been established that Kak-type protocols properly works only under CR noise. It fails under CD (unless de-
coherence free subspace is used), AD and PD noise models. Logically, a similar study on the effect of squeezed generalized
amplitude damping (SGAD) channel or generalized amplitude damping channel is also expected to yield similar result (fail-
ure). In fact, the same result (failure) is expected over the non-Markovian noise channels [52]. The present work can be
extended to include the effect of non-Markovian noise by following the prescription provided in Refs. [52]. However, we have
restricted us from doing such an exercise as that would only reveal the same limitation of Kak’s protocol.
The protocol can work under the effect of CD noise exploiting decoherence free subspaces for encoding using two-qubit
entangled logical qubits instead of single qubits (as discussed in Refs. [50, 53] and references therein). However, due to this
solution we loose the advantage of single qubit protocols, i.e., a secure protocol without using entanglement. In other words,
the use of entangled states would increase the requirement of quantum resources. Further, it may be noted that we have
already shown in the recent past that single-qubit-based quantum cryptographic schemes are advantageous when compared to
corresponding entangled-state-based counterparts [54] in the presence of noise. Another possible solution, which would work
under any kind of noise model up to moderate decoherence, is to use quantum error correction codes ( [32] and references
therein). In short, a serious investigation on the error correction scheme specifically designed for Kak’s protocol and/or a
search for suitable decoherence free subspaces may help Kak’s protocol to circumvent the limitations pointed out this paper
and thus help its implementation in the realistic situation.
Also in view of our recent results [55], that the performance of a quantum cryptographic scheme depends upon the
complexity of the task in hand and thus rounds of quantum communication involved in accomplishing the task, the three
stage protocol is expected to be more affected when compared to a single- or two-stage quantum cryptographic scheme due to
multiple rounds of travel of the single qubit through the noisy channel. Thus, despite of its several advantages, Kak’s protocol
is not preferable in presence of noise.
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